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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to present an analytical framework for publicly optimal disaster-
preventive expenditure. We examine an optimal policy combination of tax rate, disaster-preventive
expenditure, and government productive expenditure in the neoclassical growth model, in which nat-
ural disasters occur stochastically and partially destroy existing capital. Based on this model, we can
decompose the welfare eect of raising preventive expenditure into three eects: damage-reduction,
crowding-out, and precautionary savings eect. By identifying these marginal benefits and costs, we
obtain policy conditions that maximize household welfare. Furthermore, the expected growth rate
under optimal policy is considered, and an inverse -U-shaped relationship between the growth rate
and disaster probability is shown.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, increasing global economic damage has been caused by a growing number of natural
disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes as Cavallo and Noy (2011) point out. Figure
1(a) shows the trend of natural disaster occurrences in 1975–2013, and Figure 1(b) shows that the
economic damage caused by natural disasters has increased accordingly. 1 The figures imply that
the influence of natural disasters on economic behavior has become increasingly important, and it is
necessary to consider natural disasters as an economically crucial stochastic event. Moreover, because
the requisite manner of government intervention is also an economically meaningful question, we
must discuss the an intervention of governments to cope with natural disasters.
Then, how can the government intervene in natural disasters? There are two measures to cope
with natural disasters: mitigation (or abatement) and adaptation. Mitigation is a method to control
root–generating disasters. For example, mitigation may include reduction of CO2 emissions and pur-
chase of eco-friendly goods so as not to accumulate pollutants. This results in decreased occurrence
of climate change and disasters, such as abnormal meteorology or hurricanes. On the other hand,
adaptation is a method to decrease damage caused by disasters, given that disasters do occur. Adap-
tation includes refinement of buildings, reinforcement of disaster-resistant construction codes, and
preparation of survival food. Naturally, each method is equally important for tackling natural disas-
ters. In fact, the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007); “Climate
Change 2007: Synthesis Report”2 states as follows.
There is high confidence that neither adaptation nor mitigation alone can avoid all
climate change impacts; however, they can complement each other and together can
significantly reduce the risks of climate change.
Both adaptation and mitigation are required to cope with disasters, and in fact, there are many superb
examples of literature on mitigation and empirical studies about the damage caused by disasters. On
the other hand, there is little theoretical literature and few empirical studies on adaptation, especially
from the viewpoint of macroeconomic theory. As Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show, the occurrence of
1The data of each figure are obtained from Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) at URL http://www.emdat.be/. For
the data of total damage, we divide the reported damage by $1M and take natural logarithm to omit a unit root.
2This report is available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4 syr.pdf .
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disasters and resulting damage are increasing currently, and therefore, it is crucial for us to focus on
adaptation as well as mitigation. Furthermore, as IPCC says,3 there are many adaptation options,
but there is little knowledge about the eects of adaptation on macroeconomic performance, such as
consumption, savings, and economic growth rates, and other non-climate policies, such as tax rates
and productive government expenditure. Thus, it is necessary to include other non-climate policies in
addition to adaptation policy and to establish the eect of adaptation expenditure on macroeconomic
performance and other policies. To treat these problems, we require dynamic general equilibrium
with government and stochastic disaster shock.
Therefore, we construct such a macroeconomic model in which disasters destroy existing capital
stock stochastically and in which the government implements adaptive expenditure and productive
expenditure. We consider productive government expenditure, like Barro (1990), as well as adaptive
expenditure in order to establish the eect of adaptation on the other non-climate policies mentioned
above. Hereafter, for apposition we use the word “prevention” instead of “adaptation”. In this model,
Poisson stochastic disaster shock is adopted, that is, disasters occur at a certain constant probability
in each period. By adopting a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) instantaneous utility function,
we can take account of household behavior toward risk. The benevolent government implements its
policy by levying taxes from households. There are two policy alternatives in this model: disaster-
preventive expenditure and productive government expenditure. Disaster-preventive expenditure can
reduce the damage of physical capital caused by disasters, while productive expenditure increases the
productivity of final goods.
Based on this model, we can decompose the welfare eect of raising preventive expenditure
into the following three eects: damage-reduction, crowding-out, and precautionary eects. The
damage-reduction eect is the positive welfare eect in which higher preventive expenditure increases
a household’s expected disposable total income by reducing the damage caused by disasters, and thus,
3In addition, the IPCC makes the following two statements.
A wide array of adaptation options is available, but more extensive adaptation than is currently occurring
is required to reduce vulnerability to climate change. There are barriers, limits and costs, which are not fully
understood.
In several sectors, climate response options can be implemented to realise synergies and avoid conflicts
with other dimensions of sustainable development. Decisions about macroeconomic and other non-climate
policies can significantly aect emissions, adaptive capacity and vulnerability.
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it causes household’s consumption and saving to increase. The crowding-out eect is caused because
higher preventive expenditure requires the household’s finances and productive expenditure to de-
crease while tax rate increases. This decreases the household’s consumption and savings, and has a
negative impact on the household’s welfare. The third eect, which we call the precautionary eect,
is related to the household’s risk averse behavior. If the household is relatively risk-averse, it saves
more in case of natural disasters. Such savings are called precautionary saving, and aside from a de-
crease of savings due to a decrease of income from the damage caused by disasters, the saving level
under disasters’ risk is higher than that under no disaster risk. On the other hand, higher preventive
expenditure can reduce the household’s precautionary savings through a decrease of disaster risk.
Since the welfare under no disaster risk is higher than that with disaster risk, a decrease of precau-
tionary savings through higher preventive expenditure improves the household’s welfare. This eect
is generated since we adopt not log-utility but CRRA utility, and is one of the interesting implica-
tions obtained from this model. The government must choose the optimal policy by equalizing these
eects, and we can obtain optimal policy conditions in that they maximize household intertemporal
utility. Furthermore, we can show the existence of optimal policy under some assumptions.
In comparative statics, with respect to disaster probability, we can obtain two interesting results.
One is that in addition to a direct eect, the precautionary eect causes optimal preventive expenditure
to rise as disaster probability increases. This is because higher disaster probability shifts household
consumption to savings in case disaster occurs, and it is optimal for the government to invest disaster-
preventive expenditure in oder to encourage households to reallocate their savings to consumption.
This eect results from a precautionary saving motive, which cannot be captured by the static model
or dynamic model with instantaneous log-utility function. The other interesting result is that the
crowding-out eect has a negative impact on an increase of preventive expenditure in response to
disaster risk, although this eect never dominates the other two eects. This arises since higher
disaster probability reduces household expected intertemporal income, and makes the crowding-out
eect of preventive expenditure severe.
When we consider the expected growth rate, we obtain an inverse -U-shaped relationship between
this rate and disaster probability. For a small disaster probability, since household savings are lower
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(a) Occurrence of disasters (b) Total damage from natural disasters
Figure 1: Time trend of disaster risk
owing to smaller risk and the damage-reduction eect is suciently high, while expected damage
caused by disasters is not so high, the economic growth rate increases as disaster probability rises. On
the other hand, for a large disaster probability, higher preventive expenditure is paid, which decreases
household savings, and the expected loss of return of capital becomes large; hence, the economic
growth rate decreases as disaster probability rises.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the related literature is intro-
duced. In Section 3, we describe the behavior of each component of this economy: a household that
consists of a worker and investor, a firm, a government, and a disaster shock. In Section 4, we solve
the investor’s and the government’s intertemporal utility maximization problems and describe the
model’s equilibrium. In Section 5, we show the existence of an optimal policy and interpret its condi-
tions. In addition, we conduct comparative statics of optimal preventive expenditure with respect to
disaster probability. Furthermore, we obtain an expected economic growth rate and calculate its value
using a numerical example, by changing disaster probability. Section 6 summarizes the study.
2 Related literature
As mentioned in the Introduction, there is not that much theoretical literature on adaptation, especially
optimal disaster -prevention, but some does exist. The early study on reaction to natural disasters is
Lewis and Nickerson (1989), which considers private protection under deterministic disaster damage.
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With regard to studies on adaptation in a stochastic environment in which damage caused by disasters
is uncertain, Kane and Shogren (2000), Anbarci et al. (2005), and Cohen et al. (2008) construct static
models. The first study analyzes adaptation and mitigation simultaneously given a disaster occurrence
probability distribution and the last two studies focus on optimal disaster-prevention given disaster
probability. In Anbarci et al. (2005), when an earthquake occurs, the agent may die, and disaster-
preventive expenditure can decrease mortality. Cohen et al. (2008) study the dierence between
prevention and reconstruction and show that there is a moral hazard from reconstruction. With regard
to a dynamic model with adaptation policy, to the best of my knowledge, Lucas and Simon (2011),
Zeeuw and Zemel (2012), Brechet et al. (2013), and Tsur and Withagen (2013) construct such a
model. Zeeuw and Zemel (2012) and Tsur and Withagen (2013) study the dynamics of adaptation
(the former authors also study mitigation) under a stochastic once-and-for-all disaster (or catastrophe).
In such a setting, unlike our setting in which natural disasters may occur in each period, a maximum
principle can be used and the calculation becomes easier. Tsur and Withagen (2013) analyze the
dynamics of adaptation under the Solow model, which is one point of dierence from our model,
which adopts a utility-maximization problem with a CRRA utility function. Brechet et al. (2013)
study the dynamics of adaptation and mitigation with a stock of pollutants rather than stochastic
climate change and so does Lucas and Simon (2011). On the other hand, Reitz (1988), Barro (2009),
Gourio (2012), and Ikefuji and Horii (2012) use the dynamic model, which includes natural disasters
as a stochastic event. The first three studies concentrate on asset pricing, especially on solving a
risk-premium puzzle, and the last study obtains an optimal carbon tax, such that it maximizes the
economic growth rate under full-coverable disaster shock. However, their motives are not to obtain
optimal prevention, and hence, these terms do not appear in their model. If we regard preventive
expenditure as a maintenance cost, which is a similar idea in that both can decrease the depreciation
rate of capital stock, then some studies exist on optimal levels of maintenance, for example, Rioja
(2003) and Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004). Two important dierences between our study and
theirs are as follows. First, we take account of Poisson process of disaster occurrence, and hence, our
model can consider household behavior toward uncertainty. Second, we consider a trade-o between
prevention and government productive expenditure, unlike these studies. Neither of the previous
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studies treat such problems. A recent study that is close to ours is Barro (2015). In his model, which
is similar to Barro (2009), the damage caused by disasters occurs stochastically, and he considers
an optimal consumption-saving problem with optimal environmental protection, which maximizes a
representative household’s intertemporal utility. The dierence between Barro’s study and ours is
that his model adopts a Lucas-tree asset pricing model with an Epstein-Zin-Weil utility function and
it considers a socially optimal preventive expenditure.
3 The environment
3.1 A household
This model is characterized by discreet time and a closed-economy. In this economy, there are two
types of infinitely-lived households, which each comprise a worker or investor. The number of work-
ers is normalized to one and that of investors is also one. They have the same utility function and
discount factor. However, their behavior and income are dierent. A worker supplies one unit of
labor inelastically and earns wage w from a firm. We assume that the worker consumes all of his/her
income after paying tax, that is, the worker does not save his/her income. 4 On the other hand, an
investor earns income by selling his/her capital left in the previous period. The price of capital is
denoted by r, which is equivalent to the net interest rate. Here, we assume that the investor’s capital
is held in the form of machinery, and hence, there is a risk that some parts of his capital are damaged
by natural disasters. 5 In addition, we assume that there is no disaster-insurance market that com-
pensates for the investor’s damaged machinery, that is, disaster risk cannot be pooled and diversified.
Therefore, the investor must respond to disaster risk by self-insurance or adjustment of savings. From
this setting, the consumption of worker cw is derived as
cwt = (1   t)wt; (1)
4This setting enables us to obtain a closed-form of consumption and saving function under a general equilibrium model
with a CRRA utility function. Such a setting is assumed in some studies on optimal tax. The most famous study that adopts
this setting is Judd (1985).
5In reality, an investor’s savings are held in monetary assets, which are not damaged by disasters, and a firm purchases
machinery by borrowing savings from the investor before disaster risk is realized. Hence, the agent who faces uncertainty
is not the investor but the firm. However, with regard to calculation, this setting is equivalent essentially to the setting we
use in this model. Therefore, we adopt the model described in the text.
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where t is the tax rate for both worker and investor at period t. 6 The investor’s problem is somewhat
cumbersome. His/Her purpose is to maximize his/her expected utility under a budget constraint. The
expected utility at period 0 for the investor is given by
U(cIt) = E0
1X
t=0
t
c
1 
It
1    ; (2)
where cIt is the investor’s consumption at period t,  2 (0; 1) indicates a discount factor, and E0
represents an expectation operator at period 0. The reason why an expectation operator exists in (2)
is that we take account of natural disasters that occur stochastically. An instantaneous utility function
is characterized by a CRRA utility function, where  > 0 indicates the parameter of relative risk
aversion. Recall that if  = 1, an instantaneous utility function becomes logarithm utility. The budget
constraint the investor faces is given by
at+1 = [1 + (1   t)rt   ]st   cIt: (3)
In (3), at+1 is capital left to the next period, which has not been aected yet by the disaster risk, and
 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of capital. In addition, st is the resultant capital defined as (6) later.
3.2 A firm
A representative firm exists in this economy. It produces final goods, whose price is set as a numeraire,
by using machinery from investors and labor force from workers. In addition, government productive
expenditure positively aects the firm’s production. Its production technology is given by
Yt = AKt (LtGt)1 ; A > 0;  2 (0; 1); (4)
where Yt is final good production at period t, Kt represents capital stock at period t, Lt is the labor
force at period t, and Gt represents productive government spending at period t. The purpose of this
firm is to maximize its profit. Since the firm can employ Kt and Lt given Gt and use them before
disaster risk occurs, the firm faces no uncertainties.
6It may be assumed that the tax rate for the worker and investor should be separated. However, since at the optimal
policy, one of the tax rates is represented by the linear combination of the other tax rate, that is, the tax rate for the worker
is a positive linear function of the tax rate for the investor, there is little eect on the result by assuming the same tax rate
for the worker and investor.
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3.3 A government
Next we turn to the government’s behavior. The government is benevolent and its purpose is to
maximize total household welfare. The government can control the household’s utility by levying
taxes and using the tax revenue to implement its policy. There are two policy alternatives that the
government faces at period t: disaster-preventive expenditure Ht, and productive investment Gt. In
this model, following Barro (1990), we assume that Gt is a certain ratio of output, that is, Gt = gtYt for
gt 2 (0; 1). The government knows this rule and controls gt when choosing an optimal policy, while
the household and firm do not know this rule and take Gt as constant. The preventive expenditure
can reduce the damage of physical capital caused by disasters. Here, we assume that damage has a
decreasing relationship with respect not to Ht but to the preventive expenditure–production ratio ht,
where Ht = htYt. This is plausible for the following reasons. In this setting, when the absolute value
of preventive expenditure Ht increases, the damage decreases, while when output level Yt increases,
all other things being equal, the damage increases. The former is natural and the latter would be
true since if Yt is large, the economy is filled with machinery, buildings, and so on. Then, these
are destroyed in a chain reaction when the disaster occurs and this could magnify the damage ratio.
Assume that the government’s budget is balanced in each period. Then, the budget constraint becomes
t(rt st + wt) = (gt + ht)Yt: (5)
Hereafter, we denote the policy ft; ht;Gtg as t.
3.4 Disaster shock
We define disaster shock as follows. 7
 A disaster may occur after the firm finishes producing, households finish consuming and saving,
and the government finishes levying taxes and implementing its policy in each period.
7In addition to the following settings, we can introduce stochastic severity caused by disasters. In this case, we capture
the severity by introducing a random variable d which is distributed with probability density function (d)  [d; d] and
cumulative distribution function (d). However, introducing this term has little eect on the following calculation, and
comparative statics with respect to severity resembles that with respect to disaster probability. Therefore, we omit this term.
In order to introduce such severity, this version of conditions for optimal policy can be obtained by replacing D(h) with
ED(h; d) in the equation represented below, where E remains in the latter since the damage caused by disaster D(h) contains
a random variable d after the disaster occurs.
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 If a disaster occurs, a certain ratio of an existing capital stock denoted by Dt 2 [0; 1] is de-
stroyed. In this study, we call this ratio a damage ratio.
 The probability of disaster occurring is given by p, which is a constant and exogenous value.
We call this a disaster probability. The investor and government know this probability correctly.
Based on these assumptions, we can write the next level of capital st+1 as
st+1 =
8>><>>:(1   Dt)at+1 with probability p;at+1 with probability 1   p: (6)
 When the government pays preventive expenditure at period t, the damage ratio is lowered to
some degree. That is, when the government implements preventive expenditure at period t, the
damage of capital stock is reduced. Here, we assume that preventive expenditure at period t
aects only the damage ratio at period t and there are no eects thereafter.
From the fourth assumption, we can write the damage ratio at period t as a function of ht, such as
Dt = D(ht). As for the relationship between the damage ratio and preventive expenditure–production
ratio, we assume the following. 8
Dt = D(ht) 2 (0; 1); D0(ht) < 0; D00(ht)  0: (7)
The second and third properties indicate that the damage ratio function is decreasing, twice dieren-
tiable, and weakly convex with respect to the preventive expenditure–production ratio. The convexity
of the damage ratio function implies a decrease of marginal eectiveness of preventive expenditure
 D0(ht)  0. Hereafter, we abbreviate subscripts t and t+1 for notational simplicity. These equations
enable us to solve an optimal policy .
8For example, these properties are satisfied under the following fractional function.
D(h) =
ˆd   1
ˆd
+
1
ˆd + h
;
where ˆd is a constant parameter representing a vulnerability to disaster, that is, larger ˆd means more severe damage. In this
functional form, D(0) = 1 and to assure D(1) 2 [0; 1], ˆd must be equal to or larger than (p5   1)=2.
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4 Model solution
4.1 Equilibrium
In this subsection, we define equilibrium of this economy. First, we obtain market equilibrium. That
is, given the announced policy  = f; h;Gg and initial savings s0,
1. a worker consumes cw as (1) and an investor maximizes his intertemporal utility. Then, the
worker’s and investor’s consumption function and the investor’s savings function are obtained,
2. a firm chooses K and L so as to maximize its profit,
3. demand and supply for inputs are equal, that is,
s = K;
L = 1;
(8)
4. the budget constraint for the government (5) is satisfied.
Second, given the household’s consumption function, saving function, and initial condition s0,
and the government’s budget constraint (5), the government chooses an optimal policy   f; h; gg
such that it maximizes the sum of the investor’s and worker’s intertemporal utility 9 given by
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
1
1   c
1 
w +
1
1   c
1 
I
#
:
Finally, under the optimal policy, we can obtain the household’s optimal level of consumption and
savings fcw; cI ; a˜g.
4.2 Investor problem
To obtain an optimal policy, first, we must solve the investor’s utility-maximization problem by max-
imizing (2) subject to (3), given  and the initial savings s0. Denoting V(s) as the investor’s value
function, we can describe the investor’s problem at period t as
V(s) = max
fcI ;a˜g
8>><>>: c
1 
I
1    + EV(s˜)
9>>=>>; ;
subject to a˜ = [1 + (1   )r   ]s   cI  Rs   cI ; given ; s0:
(9)
9This procedure is used in, for example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Rioja (2003). In this rule, a problem exists
in which a government has an incentive to change its policy after the household and firm finish their behavior. However, by
assuming that the government commits its announced policy, we ignore this problem. In addition, see also Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2004, Chapter 15) for this problem.
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In (9), the term E indicates the expectation operator at period t and the superscript ˜ refers to the value
of variables in the next period. The term R  [1 + (1   )r   ] summarizes the return of savings.
By solving this dynamic programming problem, we can obtain the investor’s saving and consumption
function analytically as Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 By solving (9), we can obtain the investor’s savings and consumption functions as
follows.
a˜ = R1=
h
(p(1   D(h))1  + 1   p)
i1=
s  (R(h))1=s  (; h)s; (10)
cI = [R   (; h)]s; (11)
where (h)  (p(1   D(h))1  + 1   p) is a risk-adjusted discount factor and (; h)  (R(h))1= is
the investor’s savings rate for current savings.
Proof.
See Appendix A.1 for deriving (10). Then, from (3) and (10), we can obtain (11). 
Note that the savings function is aected by disaster probability p and preventive expenditure h.
The intuition of this is discussed below. Moreover, to make consumption positive, we have R  > 0.
As shown in Proposition 3 described in Subsection 5.1., this inequality must hold under optimal policy
and hence, we confine the case in which the investor’s consumption is positive.
Before moving on to the government problem, we check the signs of the derivatives of the saving
rate (; h) with respect to the disaster probability p and each policy variable. We can check the sign
of the derivative of the savings rate on the tax rate  as
@(; h)
@
< 0;
which is natural since higher tax rate decreases the investor’s disposable income and his/her savings
also decreases. On the other hand, there is an ambiguous eect of raising the tax rate on the investor’s
consumption since savings decrease while disposable income decreases, and we do not know which
eect is dominant. However, when an increase of the tax rate decreases consumption, this condition
can be written as  < R: Hence, if   1 and consumption is positive R > , this is satisfied
automatically. Positive consumption is secured under the optimal policy as Proposition 3. As we focus
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on a range of  > 1 from Subsection 4.4, a higher tax rate also decreases the investor’s consumption.
The derivative of (; h) on p is as follows.
@(; h)
@p
R 0 ,  R 1:
If  > 1, the investor is relatively risk-averse and has an incentive to save in case of disasters. The
household prefers consumption smoothing between a disaster-stricken state and no disaster state,
which is known as precautionary savings. 10 Moreover, if  = 1, which is logarithm preference,
there is no eect of disaster probability on the household’s savings. This is because the higher p
decreases the expected return on savings, while disposal income also decreases, and under logarithm
preference, a change of disaster probability does not aect the household’s savings owing to an oset
of income and substitution eect. The amount of precautionary savings is equivalent to that of a
decrease of savings from a decrease of expected intertemporal income. On the other hand, the eect
of the preventive expenditure on the savings rate is
@(; h)
@h Q 0 ,  R 1:
This derivative has an opposite sign of d(; h)=dp. This is because if higher disaster probability
increases an investor’s savings, this reflects a household’s behavior that it saves more in response to
an increase of expected damage caused by disaster represented by pD(h). In that case, the rise of h
reduces the expected loss of disaster, and hence, the household need not prepare more than before and
saves less. We call this eect the precautionary eect since higher preventive expenditure dilutes the
investor’s precautionary savings motives if he/she is relatively risk averse.
4.3 Firm problem and equilibrium condition
The representative firm maximizes its profit by choosing K and L given its factor price and policy.
The familiar conditions for profit maximization are given by
r = AK 1(LG)1 ;
w = (1   )AKL G1 :
10See, for example, Sandmo (1970) for precautionary savings.
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By substituting (8) and profit-maximization conditions into (1), (10), and (11), we can obtain
levels of consumption of both agents and the investor’s savings function under market equilibrium as
follows.
cEw = (1   )(1   )AKG1 ;
cEI = [R   (; h)]K; where R = 1 + (1   )AK 1G1    ;
a˜E = (; h)K; where R is defined above:
(12)
By using (12), the government budget constraint (5) is reduced to
g =    h: (13)
4.4 Government problem
Hereafter, we assume  > 1, that is, the investor is relatively risk-averse, which is plausible based
on both intuition and empirical studies. Given the equilibrium condition (12) and under the bud-
get constraint for the government (13), the government solves the following dynamic programming
problem by expressing Vg(K) as its value function. Notice that the government knows G = gY , and
the production function for the government becomes Y = (Ag1 )1=K  B(g)K. Moreover, for the
government, R = (1   )B(g) + 1    and w = (1   )B(g)K. Considering these, the government’s
dynamic programming problem is given by
Vg(K) = max

("
1
1   c
1 
w +
1
1   c
1 
I
#
+ EVg( ˜K)
)
;
subject to (12) and (13), given K0:
(14)
We define the consumption propensity for the government c¯ as follows."
1
1   c
1 
w +
1
1   c
1 
I
#
=
1
1   
h
[(1   )(1   )B(g)]1  + (R   )1 
i
K1   1
1    c¯K
1 : (15)
Then, the dynamic programming problem (14) is reduced to
Vg(K) = max

(
1
1    c¯K
1  + EVg( ˜K)
)
;
subject to a˜ = K, g =    h, given K0:
(16)
By substituting g =    h into B(g), this problem becomes two endogenous variables  and h.
From the calculation presented in Appendix A.2, we can obtain the first-order conditions with respect
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to f; hg as 11
1
1   K
  @c¯
@
+ pV 0g((1   D)a˜)(1   D)@
@
+ (1   p)V 0g(a˜)@
@
= 0; (17)
1
1   K
  @c¯
@h + pV
0g((1   D)a˜)
"
(1   D)@
@h
#
  pV 0g((1   D)a˜)D0(h) + (1   p)V 0g(a˜)@
@h = 0;
(18)
where superscript 0 implies a derivative. These equations mean that the marginal benefit of the cor-
responding policy must be equal to the marginal cost of the corresponding policy under the optimal
policy. The marginal condition of tax rate (17) is interpreted as follows. The second and third terms
of (17) are the marginal disutility from the reduction of savings due to a reduction of income from
raising the tax rate. The first term includes marginal disutility from the reduction of consumption due
to a reduction of income, and the marginal benefit from raising tax, which means that the levied tax is
used as government productive expenditure. The interpretation of (18) is similar to that of (17). The
second and fourth terms are the marginal disutility from raising h on savings. A decrease of savings
comes from two eects. The first is a reduction of the return of savings due to the crowding-out eect.
Higher preventive expenditure means less productive expenditure given the tax rate to finance h, and
this leads to a decrease of the return of savings R. The other eect is higher preventive expenditure
lessens an investor’s saving incentives because of the precautionary eect, as mentioned in Subsection
4.2. Higher preventive expenditure increases expected savings and this shifts the investor’s savings to
consumption. The third term of (18) is the direct eect of preventive expenditure which captures the
following benefit. Higher preventive expenditure decreases the damage caused by disasters by D0(h),
and we obtain the marginal utility by V 0g((1   D)a˜)  D0(h) because of an increase of expected in-
teremporal income. With probability p, we can enjoy this utility, and hence, this term is the marginal
utility from the direct eect of raising preventive expenditure. The first term summarizes the change
of the household’s consumption, which comes from two eects. The first is a decrease of the worker’s
and investor’s consumption due to the crowding-out eect; the second is an increase of the investor’s
consumption from the precautionary eect.
For simplification of calculation, hereafter, we assume the depreciation rate  is equal to one, that
is, full depreciation of capital. Then, we can obtain optimal policy conditions as follows from the
11For notational simplicity, we omit a variable of function such that B(g) ! B if it causes no confusion.
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calculation in Appendix A.2."
(1   )1 [(1   )B]  + (R   ) 
 
R   
R
!
+
c¯
(R   )R
#
[(1   )B0   B] = 0; (19)
 

 +

R   

[(1   )(1   )B]1  + (R   ) R
 1   
(   h)
+
h
(R   )  + [(1   )(1   )B]1 (R   ) 1
i

F(h)

= 0;
(20)
where, for convenience, we define the function F(h) as follows.
F(h)  p  D
0
(1   D) : (21)
The function F(h) indicates a marginal direct benefit from raising preventive expenditure, and is a
decreasing function since, from (7),
F0(h) =  p @
@h
 
D0
(1   D)
!
=  p D
00(1   D) + D02
(1   D)1+ < 0:
This means that the marginal direct benefit from raising preventive expenditure is decreasing. Here-
after, we assume the following to ensure that an inner solution of optimal preventive expenditure
exists.
Assumption 1 The damage ratio function (7) satisfies the following.
limh!0F(h) ! 1:
Imposing this assumption is, in fact, less restrictive than imposing the Inada condition of damage
ratio function, limh!0 D0(h) ! 1. Even when the Inada condition is not satisfied, Assumption 1 is
satisfied when D(0) = 1. The functional form presented in Footnote 8 is one example that satisfies
Assumption 1 but not the Inada condition.
By simultaneously solving (19) and (20), we can obtain the optimal policy pair f; hg, although
we do not know the existence of such a combination of roots at this time. Notice that the value of
the pair, if any, is state- and time- independent since (19) and (20) do not contain any state variables.
From the budget constraint for the government (13), the optimal productive expenditure–production
ratio g becomes    h. Given optimal policy , the resulting consumption and saving functions
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are
cw = (1   )(1   )B(g)K;
cI = [R   (; h)]K with R = (1   )B(g); (; h) = (R(h))1=
a˜ = (; h)K with (; h) defined above:
(22)
5 Optimal disaster-preventive expenditure
5.1 Existence and conditions of optimal policy
At first glance, optimal conditions (19) and (20) are too complicated to deal with. However, these
conditions can be simplified as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume R   0. Then from (19), the optimal policy satisfies the following equation.
(1   )B0 = B ,  = h + 1    !  = (h): (23)
Using (23), (20) becomesh
(R   )1  + [(1   )(1   )B]1 
i
z
F

=
h
( + z)[(1   )(1   )B]1  + (R   ) R
i 1
(1   h) :
(24)
where z = =(R   ) is the savings–consumption ratio for the investor, and all tax rates  in (24) are
evaluated at  = (h). The optimal preventive expenditure h satisfies (24).
Proof.
First, we prove that the first term of (19) must be positive under non-negative consumption R  
0. When we use the definition of c¯ and rewrite the first term of (19), it becomes"
1 +

(R   )R
#
[(1   )(1   )B]1  + (R   ) :
Hence, if R     0, this term is positive. Therefore, by dividing both sides of (19) by the first term
of (19), we obtain (23).
Next, we show that under (23), (20) becomes (24). Considering B = (Ag1 )1=, the first equation
of (23) implies the second one and this implies g = (1  )(1  h) and (1  ) = (1  h). By defining
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z  =(R   ) as an investor’s savings–consumption ratio and substituting    h = (1   )(1   h) and
z into (20), we obtain (24). 
Proposition 2 holds even under  2 (0; 1), and the confine that   1 does not aect the optimal
policy conditions. The first condition, (1  )B0 = B, implies that the government chooses  such that
a marginal increase of the household’s total income from more productive government expenditure
is equal to a marginal decrease of that from raising the tax rate. According to (23), if the preven-
tive expenditure ratio h is 0, then  = g = 1   , which is equivalent to the result of Barro (1990);
in addition, when the government finances one unit of preventive expenditure, % is collected by
raising tax and (1   )% is collected by decreasing productive expenditure. The second equation
of Proposition 3, (24), which is the most important equation in this model, summarizes the marginal
benefit and disutility from preventive expenditure. The left-hand side (LHS) of (24) is marginal utility
and the right-hand side (RHS) is marginal disutility from preventive expenditure. The LHS of (24)
summarizes marginal utility from two eects, namely, the precautionary eect and a net direct eect.
The first term implies a marginal increase of utility from an increase of the investor’s consumption,
for higher preventive expenditure causes an investor to shift savings to consumption from the pre-
cautionary eect. The second term, the net direct eect, consists of two terms. One is an increase
of utility from the direct eect, while the other is marginal disutility from a decrease of savings due
to the precautionary eect. Interestingly, the sum of these two eects becomes positive, and hence,
it is categorized in the LHS and we refer to it as net since it includes marginal disutility from the
precautionary eect. 12 The RHS of (24) is marginal disutility, which comes from the crowding-out
eect of preventive expenditure. The first term is a decrease of worker’s consumption, the second is
a decrease of investor’s consumption, and the third term is a decrease of investor’s savings due to the
12A marginal decrease of utility from a decrease of savings due to the precautionary eect is captured by c¯(1 )=(R 
)  F=, while a marginal increase of utility from the direct eect is given by c¯=(R   )  F=. Hence, the sum of these
two terms becomes c¯=(R   )  F= > 0. See Appendix A.2 for why these terms represent the precautionary eect and
the direct eect.
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(a) The case in which the intercept of the LHS is larger
than that of the RHS: One intersection
(b) The case in which the intercept of the RHS is larger
than that of the LHS: Two intersections
Figure 2: Assumption 2 and the definition of ˆh
crowding-out eect. 13 By equalizing the marginal benefit and cost of raising preventive expenditure,
we obtain the optimal preventive expenditure ratio. The presence of the precautionary eect implies
that the government under-invests in preventive expenditure if the government overlooks household’s
risk averse behavior. That is, when we consider optimal prevention under static model or instanta-
neous logarithmic utility, under-investment in prevention could occur.
The important point is whether there exists h that satisfies (24). To identify the existence of the
root of (24), we use following assumption and definition.
Assumption 2 Given p and under  = (h), we assume that one of the following is satisfied.
1. If R(0) 1 > (0), the intersection of R(h) 1 and (h) is unique (Figure 2(a)).
13If logarithm utility function is adopted, which is the case of  = 1, (24) can be rewritten as the following simple form.
F(h) = 1
(1   h) :
The reason why we obtain such a simple form under  = 1 is that the precautionary eect does not occur. In such a case, at
the same time, the direct eect and the crowding-out eect are not as complex as this model. In fact, in the above equation,
the LHS implies a direct eect, while the RHS implies a crowding-out eect.
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2. If R(0) 1 < (0), R(h) 1 and (h) intersect twice (Figure 2(b)).
This assumption is relevant to an investor’s consumption. The level of preventive expenditure
under which an investor’s consumption is zero is
R(h) = (h);, R(ˆh) 1 = (ˆh): (25)
Hence, Assumption 2 states that if the intercept of the LHS of (25) is larger than that of the RHS,
R(h) = (h) occurs only once, and otherwise, R(h) = (h) occurs twice. Each positional relationship
is depicted in Figures 2(a) and 2(b). Is this assumption too restrictive? The RHS of (25), (h),
is a decreasing and convex function, and can be drawn as Figures 2(a) and 2(b). As h increases,
disaster risk decreases but the curvature is decreasing, which is reflected by ’s decreasing and convex
properties. Notice that under h = 1, (1) > 0. On the other hand, the LHS of (25), which is an
increasing transformation of return of savings R, is decreasing and is either a concave or convex
function, depending on . The reason why R is decreasing is that higher h causes a crowding-out
eect. Note that R(1) = 0 because, then, no productive government expenditure exists, and B = 0.
In Figure 2(a), the intercept of the LHS of (25) is larger than that of the RHS, R(h) 1 is convex,
and there is only one intersection. However, if R(h) 1 is convex, many intersections may exist.
Assumption 2 eliminates this case. 14 On the other hand, when the intercept of the LHS is lower than
that of the RHS, that is, when (0) > R(0) 1, a case can exist in which there are no intersections, and
another case can exist in which there are many intersections. The former case means that the investor’s
consumption is zero investor’s consumption for any preventive expenditure, which is economically
uninteresting and Assumption 2 eliminates this case. Moreover, although more than one intersection
exists in the latter case, we confine the case to two intersections as shown in Figure 2(b). Before
proceeding, we define ˆh for proof that optimal preventive expenditure exists.
Definition 1 We define ˆh as follows.
 When R(0) 1 > (0), ˆh satisfies R(ˆh) = (ˆh):
 If R(0) 1 < (0), we define ˆh, which is larger preventive expenditure ratio that satisfies
R(h) 1 = (h). The other is denoted as hS .
14In fact, even when there are more than two items of preventive expenditure that satisfy R(h) 1 = (h) under R(0) 1 >
(0), by defining ˆh as ˆh = minfh j R(h) 1 = (h)g, we obtain Proposition 3. However, for simplicity, we omit this case.
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Figure 2(a) is the case of the first definition of ˆh. The investor’s consumption is positive for h < ˆh
and vice versa. The second case is that the intercept of the LHS is smaller than that of the RHS, and
two intersections arise, as in Figure 2(b). In such a case, we define ˆh as the larger one, that is ˆh > hS .
From Figure 2(b), for hS < h < ˆh, positive investor consumption arises, and for h < hS and ˆh < h,
zero consumption is realized. By using the definition of ˆh, we obtain the following proposition for
the existence of the root of (24).
Proposition 3 Given Assumption 1 and 2 and   1, at least one root of (24) exists, h, which is in
(hS ; ˆh).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 3 guarantees optimal preventive expenditure h and under the optimal policy, the
investor’s consumption must be positive since h < ˆh and h > hS . By appropriately rearranging
terms in (24) as (A.7) in Appendix A.3 and taking the limits h ! 0 and h ! ˆh, we can obtain Figure
3. This is an ideal figure in that only one intersection exists while, depending on parameters, multiple
intersections exist. There are probably multiple candidates for h, but we do not treat this problem
hereafter. Once h is determined, the optimal tax rate is given by  = h + 1    and the optimal
productive government ratio is g = (1   )(1   h) from (23).
5.2 Comparative statics with respect to disaster probability
In equation (24), there are some parameters, but we focus only on disaster probability p.
Proposition 4 The sign of the derivative of h with respect to disaster probability p is positive. That
is,
@h
@p
> 0: (26)
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Although this is an intuitive result, the mechanism is somewhat complex. Recall that the opti-
mal condition for preventive expenditure can be divided into three eects, direct, precautionary, and
crowding-out eects. An increase of disaster probability influences these three eects. Hereafter, we
consider the eect of a rise in p on these eects. However, before considering these eects, it would
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Figure 3: An example of the determination of h.
be useful to revisit the eect of higher probability on the investor’s behavior. The higher disaster
probability decreases the expected intertemporal income of the investor and this causes the investor’s
consumption and savings to decrease. We call this eect the income eect of higher probability. On
the other hand, in the event of a disaster, the investor saves more than previously, and the investor’s
consumption decreases whereas savings increase as disaster probability rises. We call this eect the
substitution eect.
 The direct eect
When disaster probability increases, the direct eect also increases. In such a case, an income
eect arises and the household’s savings and consumption decrease. Then, the favored policy
is the one that can mitigate the expected damage of natural disaster since more marginal utility
is derived owing to smaller consumption and savings and the concavity of the investor’s value
function. That is, since the investor experiences a more severe situation without any prevention,
it is optimal to invest preventive expenditure through the direct eect.
 The precautionary eect
A higher disaster probability causes this eect to be higher, and optimal preventive expenditure
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increases. This eect comes from the substitution eect, that is, the rise in p shifts consumption
to savings owing to the precautionary eect. Then, relatively scarce consumption makes the
marginal utility of consumption increase due to the concavity of the utility function. Since the
government knows there is an increase of marginal utility from consumption, the government
invests in preventive expenditure so that the investor reallocates savings to consumption.
 The crowding-out eect
The higher disaster probability worsens the crowding-out eect, which stems from the income
eect. The higher disaster probability decreases the investor’s expected income, and hence,
consumption and savings decrease. Now that consumption and savings are lower than previ-
ously, the marginal cost of giving up one unit of consumption and savings increases, and the
crowding-out eect is magnified.
As p increases, there is an increase in marginal benefit, consisting of the direct and precautionary
eects, while there is also an increase in the marginal cost, which is the crowding-out eect. Thus, it
may be considered that the sign of @h=@p could be ambiguous. However, as shown in Appendix A.4,
the first two positive eects must dominate the third negative eect under an optimal policy. Since
optimal preventive expenditure rises as disaster probability increases, the optimal tax rate increases
by   dhdp from (23), and productive government expenditure decreases by  (1   )  dh

dp .
5.3 Expected growth rate
Since this model eventually reduces to the AK model, endogenous growth arises. This model has
stochastic disaster shock, and hence, we evaluate the growth rate with expectations. Hence, we focus
on the expected growth rate in this subsection. The economic growth rate is defined as the growth rate
of production, which is equivalent to the growth rate of physical capital stock due to AK construction.
The saving rate per unit of physical capital is given as (; h) under the optimal policy, and the
expected growth rate is given as
Egt(h) = Et Kt+1Kt =
p(1   D(h))(; h)Kt + (1   p)(; h)Kt
Kt
= (1   pD(h))(; h):
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(a) Optimal preventive expenditure (b) Expected growth rate
Figure 4: Results of numerical example
Furthermore, since R is rewritten as 2A1=(1   )(1 )=(1   h)1=  Rc(1   h)1=, by using the
definition of  and , we obtain the expected growth rate as
Egt = Eg = (1   pD(h))

Rc(1   h)1=
h
p(1   D(h))1  + 1   p
i1=
: (27)
Higher preventive expenditure aects the expected growth rate through the following three chan-
nels. One is that more preventive expenditure reduces damage D(h) and this increases the first term
(1   pD(h)), which is the damage-reduction eect on the economic growth rate. This means that
prevention increases the existing capital stock and this enhances the economic growth rate. The sec-
ond channel is the crowding-out eect, that is, greater prevention reduces the term (1   h)1=. This
is because greater prevention requires more tax revenue, which decreases the return on capital, and
this reduces savings. This entails a reduction of the expected growth rate. The third channel is that
prevention reduces savings  since greater prevention decreases expected damage and the investor re-
duces precautionary savings. The lower savings result in a decrease of the growth rate. Since the first
eect enhances the growth rate, while the other two eects reduce it, the overall eect of preventive
expenditure on economic growth rate is ambiguous.
Considering this, we check how higher disaster probability p aects an exacted growth rate.
Since the eect of disaster probability on the economic growth rate is rather complicated, we resort to
a numerical example. To do this, we assume that the damage function is D(h) = ( ˆd   1)= ˆd + 1=( ˆd + h)
as in Footnote 8. We set benchmark parameter values as  = 0:95;  = 2;  = 1=3; A = 4; 175; p =
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0:04; and ˆd = (p5   1)=2. The setting that benchmark disaster probability is 4% follows Barro
(2015). Other parameter values except for A and ˆd are the usual parameter values. The value of ˆd
is selected as D(1) = 0, that is, when full preventive expenditure is implemented, the risk of natural
disaster is prevented fully, and total factor productivity A is set as the resulting economic growth rate
becomes about 2%. We change the value of disaster probability p from 2% to 12% per 2 percentage
points and p is from 20% to 60% per 10 percentage points in addition to 4%.
Under this parameter, the probability that exceeds 62.5% entails no investor consumption, R(h)  
(h) < 0 for all h, and hence, we focus on the probability less than 60% from Assumption 2. From
the specification of the damage ratio function, D(0) = 1 and (0) > R(0) 1, but R(h) (h) is positive
in h 2 (0; 0:35] under p = 0:04. That is, Assumption 2 is satisfied and ˆh is selected as ˆh = 0:35, while
hS is almost zero. In this setting, the optimal preventive expenditure h is around 4:475%. Notice that
h = 4:475% < ˆh = 35% and investor consumption is positive under p = 4%, as in Proposition 4.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) are scatter diagrams between disaster probability and optimal preventive
expenditure, and between disaster probability and expected growth rate, respectively. The optimal
preventive expenditure is given by the value that (24) holds, and the optimal preventive expenditure–
production ratio is from 3.4% at p = 0:02 to 17:2% at p = 0:6 as probability increases, as in Figure
4(a). As disaster probability increases, the optimal preventive expenditure increases, which is con-
sistent with Proposition 4. The corresponding expected economic growth rate, which is derived from
(27) with the optimal preventive expenditure–production ratio, is given as in Figure 4(b). The in-
teresting point is that the expected growth rate has an inverse- U-shaped relationship with disaster
probability. Until disaster probability reaches the threshold, which is between 20% and 30%, the eco-
nomic growth rate rises continuously since the higher probability (1) can increase optimal preventive
expenditure, and hence, the expected return of capital increases, and (2) entails precautionary savings
owing to higher disaster risk. These eects dominate the other negative eects for low probability,
and the economic growth rate shows a positive relationship for low probability. However, for higher
probability, the expected economic growth rate decreases as p rises. This is because, as shown in
Proposition 4, higher probability leads to higher optimal preventive expenditure, which decreases the
expected growth rate from the precautionary and crowding-out eects. Moreover, higher probability
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increases the expected damage of capital (1   pD(h))K given h, and for large probability, these
eects dominate the positive eect. Therefore, a country with moderate disaster risk experiences a
higher growth rate, while a country with severe disaster risk suers from a low economic growth rate
even when optimal public preventive expenditure is implemented. The theoretical result is consistent
with the empirical results that the eect of disaster risk on economic growth is empirically ambiguous.
According to Albara-Bertrand (1993) and Skidomore and Toya (2002), disaster risk increases with
economic growth. On the other hand, Loayza et al. (2009) and Noy (2009) show that disaster risk is
related positively to economic growth in some countries and is related negatively related to economic
growth in other countries. According to this model’s result, for small disaster risk, the former positive
relationship is supported since higher disaster risk entails a higher economic growth rate. In addition,
the latter negative relationship is realized in this model. In a country with low disaster risk, there is
a positive relationship between risk and economic growth, while in a country with high disaster risk,
there is a negative relationship between risk and economic growth.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we construct a macroeconomic model in which disasters destroy existing capital stock
stochastically and we obtain an optimal policy, consisting of a tax rate, disaster-preventive expendi-
ture, and productive government expenditure. In this model, the optimal condition for policy and the
existence of optimal policy is shown as Proposition 2 and 3. According to the condition for optimal
preventive expenditure (24), the government must choose the optimal disaster-preventive expenditure
such that the marginal utility from preventive expenditure, which is a net direct eect and a precau-
tionary eect, is equal to the marginal disutility from the crowding-out eect. The precautionary
eect is the eect in which higher preventive expenditure decreases household’s precautionary sav-
ings through a decrease of disaster risk, and the government optimally sets the preventive expenditure
to reallocate the precautionary savings into consumption. Since we introduce intertemporal utility
maximization with a CRRA utility function, the precautionary eect arises. The optimal condition
for preventive expenditure implies that if the government overlooks household risk-averse behavior,
under-investment of prevention could occur. Furthermore, in comparative statics with respect to disas-
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ter probability, we obtain a positive relationship between optimal preventive expenditure and disaster
probability. The higher probability strengthens the direct and precautionary eects, and so does the
crowding-out eect. Although the marginal benefit of preventive expenditure and the marginal cost
of preventive expenditure increase simultaneously, we can show that the marginal benefit necessarily
dominates the marginal cost. When we consider the relationship between the expected growth rate
and disaster probability, we can observe an inverse- U-shaped relationship. This is because, for low
probability, the precautionary savings and damage-reducing eect dominate the negative eects as
probability rises. On the other hand, for large probability, since the higher probability itself reduces
the expected savings and causes higher disaster preventive expenditure, which decreases the investor’s
savings, these eects dominate the positive eects, and the economic growth rate decreases as prob-
ability decreases. Such a non-monotonic relationship between disaster risk and economic growth is
supported by some empirical studies such as Loayza et al. (2009) and Noy (2009).
Finally, we present some extensions of this model. One important extension is to introduce miti-
gation in addition to prevention. Mitigation can reduce disaster probability and it would be interesting
to investigate whether each policy is substitutive or complementary. Potentially, this model suggests
that each policy is substitutive since less disaster probability leads to less preventive expenditure as
comparative statics show. The other extension would be to make this model more useful by using a
numerical method. For example, defining government expenditure and preventive expenditure as a
stock variable and introducing government debt as a safe asset could alter or strengthen our results.
These modifications would lead to many endogenous variables, and this would be dicult to solve by
hand; hence, we would have to resort to a numerical approach. Moreover, it would be interesting to
introduce technical change and human capital as disaster-proof capital. These research directions are
left to future studies.
Appendices
A.1 Derivation of equation (10) from (9)
Equation (9) is rewritten as
V(s) = max
a˜
( (Rs   a˜)1 
1    + pV((1   D(h))a˜) + (1   p)V(a˜)
)
: (A.1)
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Guess that V(s) = 11  (1s)1 , where 1 is an undermined variable. By substituting this guess into
(A.1), we obtain
(1s)1 
1    = maxa˜
( (Rs   a˜)1 
1    + p
(1(1   D(h))a˜)1 
1    + (1   p)
(1a˜)1 
1   
)
: (A.2)
The first-order condition with respect to a˜ is
(Rs   a˜)  = 1 1 (p(1   D(h))1  + 1   p)a˜   1 1 (h)a˜ ;
where (h)  (p(1   D(h))1  + 1   p) is a risk-adjusted discount rate. Hence,
a˜ = (1 + 1) 1Rs; (A.3)
where 1   (1 )=1 (h) 1=. Substituting (A.3) into (A.2) and multiplying (1 ) on both sides lead
to
(1s)1  =
n
(Rs   (1 + 1) 1Rs)1  + p[1(1   D(h))(1 + 1) 1Rs]1  + (1   p)[1(1 + 1) 1Rs]1 
o
:
The RHS of this equation can be simplified to R1  1 (1 + 1)s1 , and by equating coecients,

1 
1 = R
1  1 (1 + 1):
By solving this equation with respect to 1, we can obtain
1 = R

1   R(1 )=(h)1=
 =(1 )
:
Under this value, 1 becomes
1 = R (1 )=(h) 1=   1:
Therefore, by substituting this value into (A.3), savings function (10) is derived, that is,
a˜ = (R(h))1=s:
A.2 The derivation of equations (19)–(20) from (16)
Equation (16) is, when we consider an expectation,
Vg(K) = max

(
c¯
1   K
1  + pVg((1   D)a˜) + (1   p)Vg(a˜)
)
;
subject to a˜ = K, g =    h, given K0:
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By substituting the second constraint g =   h into B(g), this problem has only two endogenous vari-
ables  and h. Then, the first-order conditions with respect to  and h are obtained by dierentiating
(16), setting it to be equal to zero, and dividing both sides by K,
1
1   K
  @c¯
@
+ pV 0g((1   D)a˜)(1   D)@
@
+ (1   p)V 0g(a˜)@
@
= 0;
1
1   K
  @c¯
@h + pV
0g((1   D)a˜)
"
(1   D)@
@h
#
  pV 0g((1   D)a˜)D0(h) + (1   p)V 0g(a˜)@
@h = 0:
which are the same as (17) and (18). To obtain more tractable forms of these equations, we must
obtain a closed-form of value function of Vg(K). Here, we guess that Vg(K) = 21 K1 +3 for some
undetermined variables 2 and 3. Then, at the optimal policy, the derivatives of the value function
with respect to capital are given by
@Vg(K)
@K
= 2K 
= c¯K  + [p(1   D)1  + 1   p]21 K  = c¯K  + 21 K :
Therefore, by dividing both sides by K  and solving this equation with respect to 2,
2 =
c¯
1   1  = c¯
R
R    > 0: (A.4)
Hence, we obtain the value function as Vg(K) = 21 K1  + 3, where 2 is defined as (A.4) and by
substituting this value function into the first-order conditions (17) and (18) and dividing both side by
K , we can obtain such equations as
1
1   
@c¯
@
+
c¯
R   
@
@
= 0; (A.5)
1
1   
@c¯
@h +
c¯
R   
@
@h +
c¯
R   
F(h)

= 0; (A.6)
where we use 2  = c¯=(R ) and F(h) defined as (21). Next, we calculate a derivative of saving
rate  and c¯ with respect to  and h. Each is derived as follows.
@
@
=


@R
@
1
R
=

R
[(1   )B0   B];
@
@h =


"
@R
@h
1
R
+
@
@h
1

#
=


"
 (1   )B
0
R
+ (1   ) F(h)

#
;
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@c¯
@
=
"
(1   )1  @
@
[(1   )B]1  + @
@
(R   )1 
#
= (1   )
"
(1   )1 [(1   )B] [(1   )B0   B] + (R   ) 
"
@R
@
  @
@
##
= (1   )
"
(1   )1 [(1   )B]  + (R   ) 
 
R   
R
!#
[(1   )B0   B];
@c¯
@h =
"
[(1   )(1   )]1  @
@h B
1   ( 1) + @
@h (R   )
1 
#
= (1   )
"
 [(1   )(1   )]1 B B0 + (R   ) 
"
@R
@h  
@
@h
##
= (1   )
"
 [(1   )(1   )]1 B B0 + (R   ) 
"
(1   )B0
 
   R
R
!
  1   


F(h)

##
;
where, note that @R=@ = [(1   )B0   B], @R=@h =  (1   )B0, and @=@h = (1   )F(h).
Furthermore, if we assume  = 1 as in the latter half of Subsection 4.4, R = (1   )B and B0=B =
(1   )=[(   h)] from B  (A(   h)1 )1=. Then, we obtain
@c¯
@h = (1   )
"
 [(1   )(1   )B]1  1   
(   h) + (R   )
 
"
1   
(   h) (   R)  
1   


F(h)

##
By substituting derivatives with respect to tax rate into (A.5), we obtain"
(1   )1 [(1   )B]  + (R   ) 
 
R   
R
!#
[(1   )B0   B] + c¯
R   

R
[(1   )B0   B]
=
"
(1   )1 [(1   )B]  + (R   ) 
 
R   
R
!
+
c¯
R   

R
#
[(1   )B0   B] = 0:
This is the same as (19). Similarly, by substituting @=@h and @c¯=@h into (A,6),
  [(1   )(1   )B]1  1   
(   h) + (R   )
  1

"
1   
(   h) (   R)   (1   )
F(h)

#
+
c¯
R   


"
  1   
(   h) + (1   )
F(h)

#
+
c¯
R   
F(h)

= 0;
where, note that  (1   )B0=R =  (1   )=((   h)) in the first term in the bracket of the second
term. Rearranging these terms and multiplying by  on both sides lead to
 [(1   )(1   )B]1  + (R   ) (   R)   c¯
R   
 1   
(   h)
 

(1   )(R   )    c¯
R   


F(h)

= 0:
Before proceeding with calculation, we briefly interpret each term of this equation. The first three
terms are crowding-out eects that capture a decrease of productive expenditure due to an increase
of preventive expenditure. The first term is a decrease of the worker’s consumption, the second term
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is a decrease of the investor’s consumption, and the third term is a decrease of the investor’s savings.
On the other hand, the fourth term represents an increase of consumption from the precautionary
eect. This is a positive eect of preventive expenditure since more preventive expenditure shifts
savings accumulated in case disaster occurs to current consumption, which increases current utility.
The fifth eect captures the net direct eect of raising preventive expenditure. Greater preventive
expenditure implies less damage, and hence, higher resultant savings, which raise future consumption.
Interestingly, greater preventive expenditure entails less savings owing to the precautionary eect.
Here, it can be verified that the direct eect must dominate the precautionary eect of savings. Hence,
the net eect of preventive expenditure is positive and it is summarized in the fifth term.
By using the definition of c¯  [(1   )(1   )B]1  + (R   )1 , each term is simplified to
 

 +

R   

[(1   )(1   )B]1  + (R   ) R
 1   
(   h)
+
h
(R   )  + [(1   )(1   )B]1 (R   ) 1
i

F(h)

= 0:
This equation corresponds to (20).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
(24) is written as
(R   ) 
"

F

  B
#
=
"
( + z) 1
(1   h)   z
F

#
[(1   )(1   h)B]1 ; (A.7)
where, note that 1  = (1 h) and R=((1 h)) = B. In (A.7), we can show that limh!0 LHS = 1
and limh!0 RHS =  1 from Assumption 1 F= ! 1. Hereafter, to see the values of the LHS and
RHS at h ! ˆh, we check the properties of ˆh. At h = ˆh, followings are true.
1. R = ;, z ! 1,
2.
 @
@h R
 1 > @@h  ;, B > RF :
See Figures 2(a) and 2(b) for the second statement, in which the absolute value of the slope of R 1
is larger than that of  at h = ˆh. Considering these facts, we see what the LHS and RHS of (A.7)
become at h ! ˆh. At h = ˆh, the following hold.
lim
h!ˆh
LHS =  lim
h!ˆh
(R   )   lim
h!ˆh
"

F

  B
#
:
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The first term becomes infinity since (R   ) ! 0 from the first property of ˆh and  > 0. The second
term becomes negative constant at h ! ˆh since
lim
h!ˆh
"

F

  B
#
= lim
h!ˆh
 lim
h!ˆh
F

   lim
h!ˆh
B = lim
h!ˆh
RF

   lim
h!ˆh
B <  lim
h!ˆh
B    lim
h!ˆh
B = 0;
where the second equality holds from the first property of ˆh and the first inequality holds from the
second property of ˆh. Therefore, at h = ˆh, the LHS is negative infinity, that is, limh!ˆh LHS !  1.
The limit of the RHS is derived as follows. First, we use the following expression.
z
1
(1   h)   z
F

= z
 
1
(1   h)  
F

!
=
z
R
 
R
(1   h)  
RF

!
=
z
R
 
B   RF

!
:
Second, we rewrite the RHS of (A.7) as"

(1   h) +
z
R
 
B   RF

!#
[(1   )(1   h)B]1 :
Then, as h converges ˆh, the RHS of (A.7) becomes"
lim
h!ˆh

(1   h) + limh!ˆh
"
z
R
 
B   RF

!##
lim
h!ˆh
[(1   )(1   h)B]1 :
Since limh!ˆh

(1 h) and limh!ˆh[(1 )(1 h)B]1  converge to some positive constant, we can check
only the value of limh!ˆh
h
z
R

B   RF
i
. Its limit is
lim
h!ˆh
z
R|{z}
! 1
 lim
h!ˆh
 
B   RF

!
|             {z             }
positive constant
! 1;
where we use the fact that the second term converges to positive constant with the second property of
ˆh. These limits imply that the LHS is larger than the RHS at h = 0, while the RHS is larger than the
LHS at h = ˆh. Since apparently the LHS and RHS are continuous in h 2 (0; ˆh), then there must be at
least one intersection with domain h 2 (0; ˆh). See Figure 3, where one example of the LHS and RHS
of (A.7) that satisfies abovementioned conditions is depicted. 15 Finally, we show that h is larger
than hS as in Definition 1. At h = hS , unlike ˆh, the slope of (h) is larger than that of R 1. Hence,
B < RF= holds at h = hS . By using R(h) = (h) even when h = hS , the sign of F=   B is
positive, and hence, the LHS remains positive infinity, while the RHS remains negative infinity. Since
at h = 0, the LHS is positive infinity and the RHS is negative infinity, there must exist h that is in
(hS ; h). 
15Since F= > B under optimal preventive expenditure h = h as shown in Appendix A.4, the LHS of (A.7) is positive
under h = h. This implies that as in Figure 3, the intersection of the LHS and RHS of (A.7) must be in the first quadrant.
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A.4 Sign of derivative of optimal preventive expenditure with respect to disaster prob-
ability
We use equation (24) when we conduct comparative statics. First, we can obtain the following deriva-
tives under fixed preventive expenditure.
@
@p
= [(1   D)1    1] > 0;
@
@p
=


@
@p
> 0;
@
@p
F

=
F
p2
> 0;
@z
@p
= (1 + z)z 1

@
@p
> 0;
@
@p
(R   )  = (R   )  z

@
@p
> 0:
The first inequality holds since we assume  > 1. Interestingly and importantly, greater disaster
probability increases the investor’s saving rate owing to the precautionary eect; @=@p > 0. Then,
the eect of p rising on each term of equation (24) is obtained as follows.2666666664 (R   )1 |       {z       }

+[(1   )(1   )B]1 
3777777775 z F|{z}

=
2666666664( + z|{z}

)[(1   )(1   )B]1  + (R   ) |     {z     }

R
3777777775 1(1   h) :
where  means that p rising increases the corresponding term. The abovementioned five derivatives
imply that when p increases, the LHS of (24) must rise, and hence, when the RHS of (24) remains, the
LHS shifts upward and the optimal preventive expenditure increases since marginal utility increases.
To establish why the LHS shifts upward, recall that the LHS consists of a precautionary eect and
a net direct eect. Each eect increases with p rising. On the other hand, the rise of p on the RHS
is also positive. Since the RHS indicates the marginal cost of raising preventive expenditure, that is,
a crowding-out eect, a higher RHS indicates less preventive expenditure. Notice that p rising does
not aect the worker’s consumption at all since there is no precautionary eect and income eect
for the worker. The first eect of the RHS reflects a crowding-out eect that decreases the investor’s
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consumption and the second one reflects a crowding out eect that decreases an investor’s savings.
Therefore, seemingly, there is an ambiguous relationship between optimal preventive expenditure h
and disaster probability p. In what follows, by integrating these eects, we check whether @h=@p is
positive or negative. After many calculations, the sign of optimal preventive expenditure with respect
to p is obtained as follows.16
@h
@p
R 0 ," 
(   1)F

+
B

(R   )
!
(R   )  + B

[(1   )(1   h)B]1 
#
@
@p
z

+ c¯z
F
p2
R 0:
(A.8)
Recall that @=@p is positive. At first glance, the term

(   1)F + B (R   )

could be negative
since the first term is positive, while the second term could be negative. However, under optimal
policy, we can show that this term is also positive, which is a claim of Proposition 4. To prove this,
since R > , the following holds.
(   1)F

+
B

(R   ) > (   1)F

+
B

(   ) = (   1)
"

F

  B
#
:
By multiplying both sides of (24) by R and solving this equation for F=, we obtain

F

=
( + z)[(1   )(1   )B]1  + (R   ) R
[(R   )1  + [(1   )(1   )B]1 ](1 + z)B  XB:
Since we can show that X  1 if   1, under the optimal policy h = h,

F

> B:
Therefore, the first term of (A.8) is positive and this means that the LHS of (A.8) must be positive
under  > 1. Consequently, we can show that
@h
@p
> 0: 
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